I mentioned the unsettling events in Timor-Leste, suggesting that death of Alfredo Reinado could lead to his rebellion fizzling out. The BBC has a more recent report on the country, talking about how although Reinado seems to have been something of a self-seeking dodger, he nevertheless struck a chord with the many disaffected young people who feel that their country's political class have done a very poor job of running the place since independence.
At Reinado's funeral, his supporters shouted slogans from the resistance struggle against Indonesia. There is a certain irony to this, given that President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao were iconic figures in that struggle, while Reinado seems to have played little or no part in it.
I am, meanwhile, wondering if it is tiresomely pedentic to refer to the country by its official name of Timor-Leste, when i) everyone else calls it East Timor and ii) Timor-Leste is merely East Timor in foreign.
Showing posts with label Timor-Leste. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Timor-Leste. Show all posts
18 February, 2008
11 February, 2008
Timor-Leste in Crisis
Timor-Leste (better known perhaps as East Timor) has had a pretty bad time of it over the last number of years. It endured a long and brutal occupation by Indonesian forces, who showed what good losers they were by smashing the place up when they withdrew. After independence, the country's political scene was paralysed by the mutual hostility of its president and prime minister. President Xanana Gusmao had been the leader of the military struggle against Indonesia, while Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, head of the FRETILIN party, had led the political side of the freedom movement. The destruction of the country's infrastructure and the legacy of Indonesia's thuggish rule combined with the country's political paralysis to make nation-building extremely problematic.
These issues overlaid tensions within Timor-Leste's armed forces. The members of this organisation were largely sympathetic to President Gusmao, as he had led them in the war against the occupiers, but the army had its own internal tensions, between people from the west of the country and the east, with the easterners seen as being preferred for promotions by Prime Minister Alkatiri's government. In 2006, these tensions escalated into a strike by soldiers who felt they were being unfairly treated; when Alkatiri attempted to sack the striking soldiers, they mutinied and smashed up the capital until Australian troops were deployed there. After that, most of the mutineers gave up and accepted their sacking, but a core under Major Alfredo Reinado refused to surrender and decamped to remote areas in the west of the country. Reinado was indicted for murders committed during the unrest, and it is possible that fear of prosecution was a major factor driving him to remain at large.
Timor-Leste's political troubles seemed to have been resolved by last year's elections. Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta became president, while Gusmao took the more powerful job of prime minister, leading a coalition government that relegated Alkatiri's FRETILIN to the opposition. Ramos-Horta and Gusmao are political allies, and their time in office has not been largely harmonious. What is perhaps interesting is how this new political stability seemed unable to bring social stability, with Reinado and the rebels remaining at large and uncooperative.
Just how uncooperative the rebels were was illustrated today. The rebels descended on Dili in what seems to have been an attempt at either staging a coup or decapitating the government. Shots were fired at the residence of Prime Minister Gusmao, and the president was shot and critically wounded. Reinado himself was however killed in fighting outside the president's residence.
It's hard to know what will happen now. Maybe the death of Major Reinado will lead to his rebellion fizzling out, with his presence at the attack on Ramos-Horta indicating how paltry the rebel forces had become. Perhaps today's shocking events will prove to mark the end of Timor-Leste's chaotic years, with a new era of politics replacing the violent days of the past.
Some links:
East Timor declares emergency after president shot (Guardian)
Who are East Timor's rebel soldiers?(BBC)
Other Hunting Monsters posts on Timor-Leste
These issues overlaid tensions within Timor-Leste's armed forces. The members of this organisation were largely sympathetic to President Gusmao, as he had led them in the war against the occupiers, but the army had its own internal tensions, between people from the west of the country and the east, with the easterners seen as being preferred for promotions by Prime Minister Alkatiri's government. In 2006, these tensions escalated into a strike by soldiers who felt they were being unfairly treated; when Alkatiri attempted to sack the striking soldiers, they mutinied and smashed up the capital until Australian troops were deployed there. After that, most of the mutineers gave up and accepted their sacking, but a core under Major Alfredo Reinado refused to surrender and decamped to remote areas in the west of the country. Reinado was indicted for murders committed during the unrest, and it is possible that fear of prosecution was a major factor driving him to remain at large.
Timor-Leste's political troubles seemed to have been resolved by last year's elections. Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta became president, while Gusmao took the more powerful job of prime minister, leading a coalition government that relegated Alkatiri's FRETILIN to the opposition. Ramos-Horta and Gusmao are political allies, and their time in office has not been largely harmonious. What is perhaps interesting is how this new political stability seemed unable to bring social stability, with Reinado and the rebels remaining at large and uncooperative.
Just how uncooperative the rebels were was illustrated today. The rebels descended on Dili in what seems to have been an attempt at either staging a coup or decapitating the government. Shots were fired at the residence of Prime Minister Gusmao, and the president was shot and critically wounded. Reinado himself was however killed in fighting outside the president's residence.
It's hard to know what will happen now. Maybe the death of Major Reinado will lead to his rebellion fizzling out, with his presence at the attack on Ramos-Horta indicating how paltry the rebel forces had become. Perhaps today's shocking events will prove to mark the end of Timor-Leste's chaotic years, with a new era of politics replacing the violent days of the past.
Some links:
East Timor declares emergency after president shot (Guardian)
Who are East Timor's rebel soldiers?(BBC)
Other Hunting Monsters posts on Timor-Leste
12 August, 2007
Semi-presidential politics in Timor-Leste… slight return
This is another post about semi-presidentialism, triggered by a comment to my last post on Timor-Leste. I understand that many people are not so fascinated by semi-presidentialism that they want to hear more about it, but I am a slave to those who pose me questions.
A mysterious commenter identifying him or herself only as Rhunzzz mentioned the concepts of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism, originally formulated by scholars Shugart & Carey. My recollection is that they took a dislike to the term semi-presidentialism and attempted to coin new terms they felt were more descriptive. Their terms seem to have caught on to some extent, but mainly as explicit subtypes of semi-presidential regimes. The premier-presidential type sees more power in the relationship going to the prime minister, but with the elected president still doing more than nothing, while their definition of a president-parliamentary regime is one where the president can sack the prime minister or individual ministers (but I think with their replacements still being subject to parliamentary approval).
As is the way of the human world, it is difficult to precisely assign semi-presidential countries into one or other regime type. French presidents, say, often act as though they can sack ministers and prime ministers, but they do not actually have the constitutional power to do this; they can force ministerial resignations if they are the head of the government party or coalition, but not if the Assembly's majority is united against them. For all that people do use the premier-presidential v. presidential-parliamentary distinction, it all seesm a bit hair-splitty in practice.
In the Palestinian Authority, the president can sack a prime minister, but the sacked prime minister remains in office in a caretaker capacity with their government until the Palestinian parliament chooses a successor. It is not obvious to me that the president can sack individual ministers, which reminds me that I need to download the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority. I think that it the president can only sack the prime minister but not individual ministers then we are in premier-presidential territory. For more on the prerogatives of PA presidents and prime ministers, I refer you to Nathan J. Brown's "What can Abu Mazin do?".
In Timor-Leste, the constitutional powers of the president are pretty limited, which is probably one reason why Xanana Gusmao has chosen to move from the presidency to the premiership. Gusmao as president was nevertheless able to use his personal prestige and massive electoral mandate to assume a more than ceremonial role in the country's politics, playing a part in forcing Prime Minister Alkatiri from office.
A mysterious commenter identifying him or herself only as Rhunzzz mentioned the concepts of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism, originally formulated by scholars Shugart & Carey. My recollection is that they took a dislike to the term semi-presidentialism and attempted to coin new terms they felt were more descriptive. Their terms seem to have caught on to some extent, but mainly as explicit subtypes of semi-presidential regimes. The premier-presidential type sees more power in the relationship going to the prime minister, but with the elected president still doing more than nothing, while their definition of a president-parliamentary regime is one where the president can sack the prime minister or individual ministers (but I think with their replacements still being subject to parliamentary approval).
As is the way of the human world, it is difficult to precisely assign semi-presidential countries into one or other regime type. French presidents, say, often act as though they can sack ministers and prime ministers, but they do not actually have the constitutional power to do this; they can force ministerial resignations if they are the head of the government party or coalition, but not if the Assembly's majority is united against them. For all that people do use the premier-presidential v. presidential-parliamentary distinction, it all seesm a bit hair-splitty in practice.
In the Palestinian Authority, the president can sack a prime minister, but the sacked prime minister remains in office in a caretaker capacity with their government until the Palestinian parliament chooses a successor. It is not obvious to me that the president can sack individual ministers, which reminds me that I need to download the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority. I think that it the president can only sack the prime minister but not individual ministers then we are in premier-presidential territory. For more on the prerogatives of PA presidents and prime ministers, I refer you to Nathan J. Brown's "What can Abu Mazin do?".
In Timor-Leste, the constitutional powers of the president are pretty limited, which is probably one reason why Xanana Gusmao has chosen to move from the presidency to the premiership. Gusmao as president was nevertheless able to use his personal prestige and massive electoral mandate to assume a more than ceremonial role in the country's politics, playing a part in forcing Prime Minister Alkatiri from office.
09 August, 2007
Semi-presidential politics in Timor-Leste
One great thing about the reading around my thesis is that I have got to read about loads of countries I previously did not too much about. This arises because in trying to form a comparative framework in which to place a study of semi-presidentialism in Palestine I need to look at other countries with a similar kind of institutional setup. I may well pad out this blog for years to come with fascinating facts about semi-presidential countries from around the world.
Today it is the turn of Timor-Leste, as the former Portuguese colony of East Timor know prefers to be called. While the country was ruled by Indonesia the place became something of a cause celèbre, partly resulting from the thuggish and near genocidal rule of the Indonesian military. With independence, the country largely dropped off the world's radar, or at least it did off mine, apart from a sense that the country's post-independence politics had all proved a bit tawdry and disappointing.
My very limited reading about Timor-Leste suggests some interesting things about the country's politics. Indonesian rule was resisted both militarily and politically, as is often the case in occupied countries. What one sometimes see in such situations is that if the national struggle is ever successfully concluded then a tension erupts between the political and military side of the nationalist movement. Analysis tends to depict the political side of any ensuing conflict as the good guys, in that they are the ones who will do politics (run for elections, form governments, make the kind of political compromises that are needed in a democratic society). In contrast, the militarists are seen as the bad guys – while they may have proved useful during the freedom struggle, the kind of mindset honed by warfare is inimical to democratic politics. Militarists are seen as hostile to compromise and having a belief in discipline and hierarchy that meshes badly with the give and take of pluralist politics. That, as I say, is the default position on such matters, or maybe I am just generalising too much from the history of my own country.
Timor-Leste seems to run counter to that default position. There, the political wing of the national struggle seems to have produced a party (FRETILIN) with a closed, illiberal, and crypto-authoritarian outlook, one that sees itself as the sole legitimate representation of Timor-Leste's people. In contrast, the military wing of the movement produced in Xanana Gusmao a leader who seems far keener to reach out across Timor-Lestean society and to respect democratic norms; during the Indonesian occupation he transformed the guerrilla army from being a FRETILIN militia to being a more broadly based outside the party's control. It is maybe easy to see why FRETILIN turned out the way it did – the party early on adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology that lends itself to vanguardism, and the party cultivated close links to authoritarian leftist regimes in Africa from whom shady ideas could be picked up. Gusmao's non-bonapartism is maybe a bit harder to explain, but I will leave that to people who know more about the country to engage with.
As a semi-presidential regime, Timor-Leste has also bucked the trend. In these kind of countries, particularly when they are newly democratising, there is a tendency to see the president as embodying authoritarian tendencies, with the parliamentary side of things serving as a democratic brake. After Timor-Leste's first presidential and parliamentary elections the country was pitched into cohabitation, with the parliament choosing a prime minister hostile to the president. However, it was nasty, authoritarian FRETILIN who picked the prime minister, while President Gusmao ended up serving as a brake on their crypto-authoritarianism. The country's divisions, reflected by the split executive, saw the country becoming increasingly destabilised, with a series of riots and army mutinies leading to the smashing up of any infrastructure the Indonesians had not wrecked before they pulled out. Elections this year saw Gusmao ally (and Nobel laureate) Jose Ramos-Horta elected to the presidency while Gusmao has just become prime minister at the head of a coalition government. Maybe this united executive will be able to stabilise the country's politics, though the pro-FRETILIN riots that greeted Gusmao's appointment suggest they have a way to go yet. Still, a coalition government, even one that excludes FRETILIN, is probably a good thing for the country at this point, certainly better than the FRETILIN dominated parliament it had before the elections.
One caveat on all this – I have actually read so little on Timor-Leste that I could be passing on a very skewed impression of the country's politics. It is only really one scholarly article* from which I picked up the idea of Gusmao-good FRETILIN-bad position, so if that was written by someone with tendentious views then I could be seriously misleading you. However, the fact that Mara Alkatiri, the FRETILIN leader, has denounced the current government as illegal, despite its parliamentary majority, suggests that his party's commitment to democratic electoral outcomes is a bit tenuous.
*Shoesmith, Dennis (2003) 'Timor-Leste: divided leadership in a semi-presidential system' Asian Survey, 43 (2), 231-252
Today it is the turn of Timor-Leste, as the former Portuguese colony of East Timor know prefers to be called. While the country was ruled by Indonesia the place became something of a cause celèbre, partly resulting from the thuggish and near genocidal rule of the Indonesian military. With independence, the country largely dropped off the world's radar, or at least it did off mine, apart from a sense that the country's post-independence politics had all proved a bit tawdry and disappointing.
My very limited reading about Timor-Leste suggests some interesting things about the country's politics. Indonesian rule was resisted both militarily and politically, as is often the case in occupied countries. What one sometimes see in such situations is that if the national struggle is ever successfully concluded then a tension erupts between the political and military side of the nationalist movement. Analysis tends to depict the political side of any ensuing conflict as the good guys, in that they are the ones who will do politics (run for elections, form governments, make the kind of political compromises that are needed in a democratic society). In contrast, the militarists are seen as the bad guys – while they may have proved useful during the freedom struggle, the kind of mindset honed by warfare is inimical to democratic politics. Militarists are seen as hostile to compromise and having a belief in discipline and hierarchy that meshes badly with the give and take of pluralist politics. That, as I say, is the default position on such matters, or maybe I am just generalising too much from the history of my own country.
Timor-Leste seems to run counter to that default position. There, the political wing of the national struggle seems to have produced a party (FRETILIN) with a closed, illiberal, and crypto-authoritarian outlook, one that sees itself as the sole legitimate representation of Timor-Leste's people. In contrast, the military wing of the movement produced in Xanana Gusmao a leader who seems far keener to reach out across Timor-Lestean society and to respect democratic norms; during the Indonesian occupation he transformed the guerrilla army from being a FRETILIN militia to being a more broadly based outside the party's control. It is maybe easy to see why FRETILIN turned out the way it did – the party early on adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology that lends itself to vanguardism, and the party cultivated close links to authoritarian leftist regimes in Africa from whom shady ideas could be picked up. Gusmao's non-bonapartism is maybe a bit harder to explain, but I will leave that to people who know more about the country to engage with.
As a semi-presidential regime, Timor-Leste has also bucked the trend. In these kind of countries, particularly when they are newly democratising, there is a tendency to see the president as embodying authoritarian tendencies, with the parliamentary side of things serving as a democratic brake. After Timor-Leste's first presidential and parliamentary elections the country was pitched into cohabitation, with the parliament choosing a prime minister hostile to the president. However, it was nasty, authoritarian FRETILIN who picked the prime minister, while President Gusmao ended up serving as a brake on their crypto-authoritarianism. The country's divisions, reflected by the split executive, saw the country becoming increasingly destabilised, with a series of riots and army mutinies leading to the smashing up of any infrastructure the Indonesians had not wrecked before they pulled out. Elections this year saw Gusmao ally (and Nobel laureate) Jose Ramos-Horta elected to the presidency while Gusmao has just become prime minister at the head of a coalition government. Maybe this united executive will be able to stabilise the country's politics, though the pro-FRETILIN riots that greeted Gusmao's appointment suggest they have a way to go yet. Still, a coalition government, even one that excludes FRETILIN, is probably a good thing for the country at this point, certainly better than the FRETILIN dominated parliament it had before the elections.
One caveat on all this – I have actually read so little on Timor-Leste that I could be passing on a very skewed impression of the country's politics. It is only really one scholarly article* from which I picked up the idea of Gusmao-good FRETILIN-bad position, so if that was written by someone with tendentious views then I could be seriously misleading you. However, the fact that Mara Alkatiri, the FRETILIN leader, has denounced the current government as illegal, despite its parliamentary majority, suggests that his party's commitment to democratic electoral outcomes is a bit tenuous.
*Shoesmith, Dennis (2003) 'Timor-Leste: divided leadership in a semi-presidential system' Asian Survey, 43 (2), 231-252
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